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Articles
ENRON-WHEN ALL SYSTEMS FAIL: CREATIVE DESTRUCTION OR
ROADMAP TO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM?
DOUGLAS M. BRANSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
E NRON'S self-destruction has led to much in the way of corporate gov-
ernance reform. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act' is a package of fifteen or
more "reform" measures, several of which hold promise for improvements
in our governance scheme and several of which do not. 2 But those hopes
for improvement come with a cost. The reforms federalize controls over
corporate officers and directors that traditionally have been the province
of state law. 3 They achieve, by the back door so to speak, what Ralph Na-
der and his cohorts failed to achieve in the 1970s-federal control of cor-
porate behavior. 4 Besides the great damage to federalism, Sarbanes-
Oxley's provisions, and the political climate surrounding them, may stifle
* W. Edward Sell Chair in Law, University of Pittsburgh.
1. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
2. See Signing Statement of George W. Bush,July 30, 2002, available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/20020730-10.html (suggesting that
Sarbanes-Oxley contained most far-reaching reforms of American business prac-
tices since time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt).
3. See DoucLAs M. BRANSON, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE V (1993) (" [G] iven that
in the United States corporations are creatures of state and not federal laws, and
given the so-called 'internal affairs' choice of law rule, that the law of the incorpo-
rating state controls issues of corporate governance, state law is the heart and soul
of United States corporation law."); see also CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am.,
481 U.S. 69, 78-87 (1987) (recognizing interplay between federal and state laws
that regulate corporate governance); Richard M. Buxbaum, The Threatened Consti-
tutionalization of the Internal Affairs Doctrine in Corporate Law, 75 CAL. L. REV. 29, 29
(1987) (acknowledging state government's interest in regulating corporate
processes and federal government's efforts to control state regulations).
4. See, e.g., RALPH NADER, MARK GREEN & JOEL SELIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONALIz-
ING THE CORPORATION: THE CASE FOR FEDERAL CHARTERING OF GIANT CORPORA-
TIONS 1-85 (1976) (discussing federal role in corporate enterprise and
development of federal chartering); Donald Schwartz, Federal Chartering of Corpora-
tions: An Introduction, 61 GEO. L.J. 71, 71-73 (1972); Note, Federal Chartering of Corpo-
rations: A Proposal, 61 GEO. L.J. 89, 95-102 (1972); cf William L. Cary, Federalism and
Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 700-03 (1974) (proposal
(989)
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the informed risk-taking that led to a decade of economic growth unparal-
leled in United States history, a decade in which our system of corporate
governance arguably did improve and did work tolerably well.
Enron may just have been an aberration. Like an improbable airline
crash, in Enron, error compounded error. Redundant systems failed.
The auditors did not gain a full understanding of what had happened.
Neither the Enron audit nor finance committees "caught it." The full
board of directors did not "catch it." A prestigious law firm or two missed
it. Neither the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), the debt rating
agencies nor the banks caught on.
If you believe former Enron CEO Jeffrey Skilling's and former Chair-
man Kenneth Lay's versions of events, they, too, did not fully realize what
was occurring. Enron may have been a massive corporate governance fail-
ure that will be a rare occurrence in this era of good governance. 5 If you
factor in the other corporate governance imbroglios (Xerox, Quest Com-
munications, ImClone, World Com, Global Crossing, Adelphia, Merck,
Tyco and the like) into our year of corporate governance discontent, it
still adds up to only approximately twenty companies out of the 16,200
companies that file periodic reports with the SEC.6
Arguably, any reform called for a rifle, not a shotgun, but what we
received with Sarbanes-Oxley is something in between. In Part II of this
Article, I attempt to articulate an overarching view of corporate govern-
ance as it has evolved, and vastly improved, since around 1980. In Part III,
the story shifts to Enron and considers the improbability of such a com-
plete implosion. Implosion raises the question of whether or not Enron,
as the putative virtual firm, simply pushed the envelope too far, too soon,
thus showing the way to the future for others who follow and, in that way,
constituting "creative destruction."
Part VI scrolls through the Sarbanes-Oxley corporate governance re-
forms, reaching the conclusion many others have reached-that there are
a few positives, not too many negatives and a host of open questions in the
legislation. Part V delves into the real shortcoming of Sarbanes-Oxley,
which is that it, and its authors and sponsors, failed to look completely at
what is good about our system of corporate governance, with a view toward
enabling and enhancing it. A sidebar is that the Congressional actors did
nothing whatsoever about several glitches in governance that Congres-
sional reports demonstrate led directly to Enron.
for federal minimum fiduciary and other standards, enforceable in court proceed-
ings, rather than federal takeover of corporate chartering of large corporations).
5. This sentence and the previous paragraph paraphrase a solicited op-ed
piece written for USA Today. See Douglas M. Branson, Enron Is an Aberration, USA
TODAY, Mar. 1, 2002, at 9A.
6. See Framework for Enhancing the Quality of Financial Information
Through Improvement of Oversight of the Auditing Process, 67 Fed. Reg. 44,964,
44,999 (proposed July 5, 2002) (listing approximately 16,200 operating and 5000
investment companies reporting to SEC).
[Vol. 48: p. 989
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By way of conclusion, Part VI returns to the creative destruction
theme, not in the sense of destruction of a business plan that pushed the
envelope too far, but in a broader, cultural sense. Enron, our other gov-
ernance imbroglios, the political and market reactions thereto and all the
other fallouts have led to creative destruction of the "winner's culture,"
"the good deal exemption" culture and the "rising tide floats all boats"
(and covers up mistakes and opportunism) culture, which, in moderation,
may or may not have served us well. Later in the 1990s, and into the new
century, however, that culture constituted the real cancer in our system of
corporate governance. The new ethics and the new culture that emerges
from this troubled epoch may well be the real reform.
II. THE "GOOD GOVERNANCE" MOVEMENT AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 1980-2000
A. What is Corporate Governance?
I have defined corporate governance as the process by which the
power to allocate the corporation's resources, and the resources them-
selves, are allocated among the various organs of the corporation, namely,
officers, directors, shareholders and employees. 7
More eloquent is Professor John Farrar:
The etymology of "governance" comes from the Latin words
gubernare and gubernator, which refer to steering a ship and to the
steerer or captain of a ship.... The word "governance," which
has a rather archaic ring to it, comes from the old French word
"gouvernance," and means control and the state of being gov-
erned.... Thus we have from the etymology of the word a useful
metaphor-the idea of steering or captaining a ship. We have
references to control and also to good order, which is more than
simply being on course: it is also being shipshape and in good
condition 8
B. Governance in the Days of Ozzie and Harriet
For most of the twentieth century, large corporations had self-perpet-
uating, insider-dominated boards of directors. The corporate president
(today's CEO) handpicked candidates for board service. Routinely, a criti-
cal mass of directors including, for example, the executive vice-president
(today's Chief Operating Officer), the corporate treasurer, a principal
shareholder and the chief operating officers of two or three principal divi-
sions or subsidiaries, or even a majority of directors, were insiders. Those
7. See, e.g., BRANSON, supra note 3, § 5.01; see also DouGLAs M. BRANSON,
PROBLEMS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 17-27 (1997).
8. JOHN FARRAR, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND 3
(200]).
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insiders were joined by outside directors who had a degree of financial
dependency on the corporation, thus lacking independence. Among the
latter might be an investment banker, a commercial banker or the senior
partner from the headquarters' city law firm that did the bulk of the cor-
poration's legal work.9
Refinements on this theme included neutralizing the board through
large board size. For example, at one time, General Motors had a board
of twenty-seven directors.' 0 On the very large boards, motivated directors
who wished to be proactive faced collective action problems that pre-
vented effective networking among fellow directors. The insider group,
though less than majority, would almost always be assured of the ability to
call the shots.
Another variant was the strong executive committee of the board.
Often, the executive committee, which possessed nearly all the power of
the full board, was the only board committee. The executive committee
would not only be staffed predominantly, but rather exclusively, by insid-
ers. Full board of directors meetings were window dressing. The real ac-
tion took place within the executive committee.
In the days of Ozzie and Harriet, contrary to what one might expect,
directors were not frustrated by the status quo. Outside directors enjoyed
the prestige of office and financial perks, including a satisfactory annual
retainer and meeting fees. Once a year, they would attend a "fly away"
directors meeting or retreat at a resort or in New York or San Francisco. If
they did disagree with management, the prevailing ethic of "love it or
leave it" caused them to resign. Not many did so because being a director
of a large United States corporation remained true to Lord Boothby's dic-
tum in mid-Victorian England that being a company director is akin to a
nice warm bath.I'
Outside monitors of corporate performance were few. They might
have included shareholders who were members of the business's founding
families and who had retained large shareholdings, "relational investors"
in today's terms. They included the outside "Big 8" accounting firm,
which served as the independent auditor. Lastly, they included a lawyer or
two, namely, the senior partner from the outside law firm and perhaps the
senior "in house" lawyer.
Auditing firms performed only audit services. Although their inde-
pendence might be comprised because of the substantial fees they would
receive from the very entity whose financial statements they were auditing,
9. See RALPH D. WARD, 21ST CENTURY CORPORATE BOARD 4 (1997).
10. See id. at 4. "Corporate boards, up until fairly recent times, were a disqui-
eting example: the classic walnut-paneled boardroom, the strict rules on what was
and was not to be said, the legalistic, ornate terminology, even the occasional
member nodding off. Board meetings [resembled] .. .one of those baroque ritu-
als of British royalty that has long lost its original purpose." Id. at 198.
11. See FARRAR, supra note 8, at 122. See generally ROBERT RHODES JAMES, ROB-
ERT BoOTHBY-A PORTRAIT OF CHURCHILL'S ALLY (1991).
992 [Vol. 48: p. 989
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they were not about to sacrifice their firm's reputation, which brought in
many clients, for the sake of one or two renegade clients that wanted to
push the envelope. Moreover, accounting firm partners were profession-
als who valued their reputation above all else. They exalted the principle
of "accounting conservatism." They would never sign off on dubious or
dishonest accounting tricks.' 2 They ensured that financial statements ac-
curately represented economic reality.
In the 1970s, the regulators took several steps to enhance auditor in-
dependence. The SEC made a change of auditors a reporting require-
ment for purposes of SEC Form 8K, which must be filed shortly after the
change occurs and commands the attention of the SEC, if not the finan-
cial world.' 3 The Commission brought some celebrated cases against au-
ditors, such as United States v. CarlJ Simon,14 that made clear what the
Commission thought auditors' roles were.
Lawyers had clout. Corporations sent most of their legal work to one
outside law firm. The senior partner through which business was funneled
had as good an overview of the corporation's myriad of activities as any-
one, save the president and the executive vice president. He (there were
few "she's" in those days) sat on the board. Often he was a close confidant
of the CEO. He filled the role not only of the attorney but of the "wise
counselor" as well.
Those were idyllic days. Companies concentrated on producing
goods and services and controlling costs. Revenues showed steady, but
unspectacular growth. In 1955, the DowJones average stood at 442.72 and
by 1960, it had risen only to 618.04.15 Hostile takeover bids, New York
arbitragers and poison pill takeover defenses were unknown. Finance and
"financial guys" were not ends in themselves. They served only to provide
funding for expansion or modernization, or to tide the company over dur-
ing periods of reduced cash flow.
C. Beginning Reform
No particular spate of corporate scandals precipitated corporate gov-
ernance reform in the United States. The fallout from the Vietnam War,
the environmental movement, Earth Day in 1970 and the consumer move-
ment were ciphers for a general angst that led to prolonged efforts to
12. Cf Abraham Briloff, "We Often Paint Fakes", 28 VAND. L. REV. 165, 195-200
(1975) (providing "A to Y Roll of Dishonor," including lists of corporate names
and corporations in which financial accounting was deficient).
13. See Regulation of Securities Offerings, 63 Fed. Reg. 67,174, 67,244 (pro-
posed Dec. 4, 1998).
14. 425 F.2d 796, 806-08 (2d Cir. 1969) (noting that compliance with Gener-
ally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) may be "very persuasive," but is not
necessarily conclusive in accountant's defense under federal securities laws).
15. See HARBERT STEIN & MURRAY Foss, THE ILLUSTRATED GUIDE TO THE AMERI-
CAN ECONOMY 167 (3d ed. 1999) (table). In contrast, by 1996, the Dow stood at
5742.89. See id. In 1999, the Dow reached 10,700. See id.
20031
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challenge and then change "the system." Large corporations were part
and parcel of "the system." The corporate social responsibility movement
of the mid-1970s called for corporate social accounting and disclosure,
public interest corporate directors and increased consumer and worker
protection.1 6 More broadly based were proposals for federal chartering of
large corporations or for minimum federal standards that would displace
overly lax state laws.17
Authoritative reform got underway in the late 1970s, again though,
and unlike today, without the impetus of any particular corporate scanl-
dals. Corporate law had long provided that "the business and affairs of a
company [be] managed by the board of directors."1 8 In 1975, the Ameri-
can Bar Association Committee on Corporate Laws amended the Model
Business Corporation Act, the law of thirty-six states, 19 to accord with real-
ity: "the business and affairs of [a] corporation [were to be] managed
under the direction of [a] board of directors."20 Especially in larger cor-
porations, it had become a fiction that boards and directors actually did or
could manage.
Another authoritative source came even closer to the reality of mod-
ern corporate life: the corporation's business and affairs were to be man-
aged by the corporation's senior executives. In turn, rather than
managing, the directors' role was to hire, to monitor and, if necessary, to
replace the senior executive officers. 2 1
In its monitoring role, the board of directors was to be assisted by a
committee structure. The audit committee would help to assure the integ-
rity of the accounting information upon which the full board would base
its evaluations of senior executives. The audit committee became a sec-
16. See generally Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Governance "Reform" and the New
Corporate Social Responsibility, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 605, 611-615 (2001).
17. For a discussion on proposals for federal chartering, see supra note 3 and
accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., HARRY G. HENN, LAw OF CORPORATIONS § 203, at 406 (2d ed.
1970) (board "shall manage business and affairs"); see also WILLIAM CLARK, JR.,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF CORPORATIONS § 192, at 472 (2d ed. 1907) (same).
19. See Douglas M. Branson, Recent Changes to the Model Business Corporation Act:
Death Knells for Main Street Corporation Law, 72 NEB. L. REV. 258, 259-60 (1993) (list-
ing states in which Model Business Corporations Act (MBCA) is effective).
20. See Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Model Business Corpora-
tion Act, 29 Bus. LAw. 947, 949-56 (1974) (providing proposed revisions to MBCA
§ 35 and comments to suggested amendments); Report of Committee on Corporate
Laws: Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act, 30 Bus. LAw. 501, 501-03 (1975)
(providing approval for revisions to MBCA § 35).
21. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.02 (1994) ("The management of the business
of a publicly held corporation should be conducted by or under the supervision of
such principal senior executives as are designated by the board of directors .... ").
"The board of directors of a publicly held corporation should ... [s]elect, regu-
larly evaluate, fix the compensation of, and, where appropriate, replace the senior
executives." Id. § 3.02(a)(1).
[Vol. 48: p. 989
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ond monitor, or a monitor within a monitor; as it pursued its specialist
function on behalf of the full board of directors.
The nomination or governance committee would take the choice of
board nominees out of the CEO's hands, thus preserving the indepen-
dence of the board, which, in the 1980s, came to be populated with a
majority or, indeed at many corporations, a super majority of independent
directors. Through its repeated invocation of the business judgment rule,
the Supreme Court of Delaware reinforced these developments. Each
Delaware court opinion began with an inventory of directors, sorting them
out as independent or not independent. In Delaware, decisions by truly
independent directors were entitled not only to business judgment rule
protection but to "heightened business judgment rule protection."2 2
D. The "Good Governance" Era
In the 1990s, activist institutional investors, mainly public employee
and labor union pension trusts, pushed hard for good governance at port-
folio companies. Their agenda included a super majority of independent
directors, bifurcation of the office of chairman and CEO, so that the CEO
could no longer control the timing and agenda for meetings, secret ballot-
ing at shareholders' meetings, rescission of poison pill takeover defenses
that entrenched management and declassification of staggered boards,
which also represented an obstacle to takeovers and so on. Institutions
became "relational investors" who focused not upon particular company
specific issues but upon good governance. They became monitors of good
governance in their activist role and monitors of firm performance in
their investment role.
Large, mature companies often went to debt and commercial paper
markets to borrow large sums. The debt rating agencies, such as Moody's,
Fitch and Standard & Poors, began tracking companies on a more or less
continuous basis. A downgrade or placement on a credit watch list could
impose hundreds of millions of additional borrowing costs on companies.
The "Big 8" shrunk to the "Big 5" through mergers. The SEC insisted
upon a "clean" opinion letter accompanying financial statements. Wall
Street insisted that the opinion letter be by a "Big 5" firm. Seemingly,
accountants' and "Big 5" firms' hands were strengthened. The stock mar-
ket boomed. Major securities firms hired analysts by the hundreds. Shirt-
sleeve capitalism spread like never before. Thousands of analysts moni-
tored firm performance.
One monitor, or potential monitor of firm performance, faded in this
era. Often the major headquarters' city law firm no longer captured and
controlled a corporation's business. Corporations came to regard legal
services as commodities to be purchased. The wise counselor role faded.
Corporations spread their legal business among ten, twelve or even twenty
22. Ivanhoe P'ship v. Newmont Mining Co., 535 A.2d 1334, 1343 (Del. 1987).
2003]
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law firms, in part because they no longer wished to have any one outside
lawyer who had an overview of the corporation's business dealings. Attor-
neys became transaction engineers dealing with a single "deal," or, if they
performed well and priced their services right, a series of deals. Other law
firms became litigation counsel, but only for a single piece of litigation, or
a group of similar cases.
E. A Preliminary Assessment
Governance has come a long way from the Ozzie and Harriet days in
which mushroom directors (kept in the dark with manure piled upon
them) prevailed. Corporate performance, senior executives' performance
and governance is closely watched by no less than eight or nine sets of
monitors, including the independent directors who populate boards to-
day; the audit committee; debt rating agencies; securities firms and their
analysts; accounting firms who perform essential audit services; law firms
in some cases; specialized regulators with whom reports are filed (state
insurance commissions, Comptroller of the Currency, other banking au-
thorities and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)); the SEC,
with whom companies file quarterly, annual and special reports; activist
institutional and other relational investors; and the ever expanding finan-
cial press, ranging from CNN Financial to the Wall Street Journal, Fortune,
Forbes and Business Week, to name a few.
Some of these monitors are "gatekeepers." Professor Jack Coffee de-
fines gatekeepers as "reputational intermediaries who provide verification
and certification services to investors."23 I would describe gatekeepers as a
subset of monitors who supply essential verification and certification ser-
vices to corporations. Legally, or practically, corporations cannot survive
without the imprimatur of certain professionals and regulatory bodies. In
turn, as third party beneficiaries of sorts, investors benefit, but they benefit
by the presence and vigilance of all the monitors, not merely the
gatekeepers.
Essential in modern corporate life are the verifications performed by
the audit committee, the independent auditors, the debt rating agencies
and state and federal regulators, including the SEC. By contrast, corpora-
tions can, and do, prosper, without a significant following by securities
analysts, without big name law firms (which have often been supplanted by
several firms as corporations spread their business around) and without
institutional or other relational investors. Having analysts and institutions
interested in your corporation can be very nice, but it is not essential.
The year before its demise, Enron had become the seventh largest
corporation in the United States, in terms of market capitalization. Year
after year Enron sat atop Fortune's list of "most admired" companies. As
such, Enron had a first-class set of gatekeepers and monitors, including
23. John C. Coffee,Jr., Understanding Enron: It's About the Gatekeepers, Stupid, 57
Bus. LAw. 1403, 1405 (2002).
[Vol. 48: p. 989
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strong representation by all the monitoring groups, ranging from a pres-
tigious board and audit committee (including Arthur Andersen as audi-
tors, Vinson & Elkins as general counsel and Kirkland & Ellis as counsel to
its off book special purpose entities), to a myriad of securities analysts fol-
lowing the stock, strong institutional shareholding and daily coverage by
the financial press. Yet nobody caught on to what Enron and its execu-
tives were up to. Why? What explains this massive failure of both
monitors and gatekeepers? What happened?
III. THE CREATIVE DESTRUCTION HYPOTHESIS
A. The First Story-From Pedestrian Utility to Wannabe Trading Giant24
Enron's roots were in natural gas (Houston Natural Gas) and pipe-
lines. In 1984, Enron obtained, as CEO, the services of Kenneth Lay, a
Ph.D. in economics, who had a strong belief in markets. Lay fended off a
hostile takeover bid by Coastal Corp., in part with defensive acquisitions of
Florida Gas and Transwestern Pipeline. He then caused Enron to team up
with InterNorth, an Omaha based pipeline company whose network fit
hand-in-glove with Enron's. After the merger, the surviving corporation,
InterNorth, was renamed Enron. Still later, Lay fended off an attempt by
takeover-player, Irwin Jacobs, to put Enron "in play."
With deregulation of natural gas in the second Reagan administra-
tion, Enron was perfectly situated. It had a CEO and other senior execu-
tives who understood markets and who also understood the ins and outs of
the 200,000 mile gas pipeline grid that crisscrossed the United States.2 5
Enron then hired a former McKinsey & Co. consultant, Jeffrey Skilling,
who came to the company with ideas fresh from the financial world and
the idea for a "natural gas bank."
Natural gas was becoming more in demand because of its environ-
mentally desirable characteristics. Gas burns cleanly, almost invisibly, and
had become the fuel of choice for industrial users and electric power
plants. Indeed, with the demise of nuclear power, natural gas completely
captured the new power plant market. Deregulation allowed for national
markets, no longer subject to public utility commissions on a state-by-state
basis. With gas's popularity, deregulation and national markets, however,
came chaos and seemingly perpetual upward-trending prices.
Both producers and consumers desired to arrange in advance the
purchase of some gas at fixed prices for delivery in the "forward" market.
24. I am grateful to Professor William Bratton who, among journalists,
academics and others, has the most complete understanding of what occurred at
Enron that I have encountered. Professor Bratton presented a virtuoso exposition
at Tulane University School of Law in April 2002. See generally William Bratton,
Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REv. 1275 (2002).
25. The network is five times as long as the interstate highway system, which is
46,000 miles long. WORLD FACTBOOK (2002), available at /geos/us.html (listing
length of U.S. expressway system as 45,936 miles, length of U.S. gas pipeline system
as 205,220 miles).
2003] 997
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Other consumers did not want to be forced to purchase gas they did not
need. They were interested in options to buy at stated prices, rather than
firm "forward contracts." Under Skilling's tutelage, Enron began to trade
and slice these contracts, much as New York financiers had taken to carv-
ing up traditional financial products such as debt, into separate rights to
receive interest and principal, and so on. Enron also provided "swaps"
that would allow a consumer to trade a fixed price contract for a floating
price contract, or to trade an option for a forward contract.
Enron delivered some of the gas through its pipeline network but it
could also arrange for local distributors in various parts of the country to
deliver the gas. Enron's profits equaled the difference between the con-
tract price and the price it had to pay the local gas distributor. As the
middleman between producers and consumers, Enron was able to mark
up prices in other ways as well.
Skilling and Enron learned, though, that they had only a two-year or
so head start on would-be competitors. While the liquidity provided by the
market made the commodity trading (for example, gas contracts) quite
lucrative, the increased profits so engendered attracted competitors. Al-
ready, Williams Co. and El Paso Natural Gas Corp. had implemented busi-
ness plans to become trading companies in natural gas and pipeline
capacities.
So Kenneth Lay, Jeffrey Skilling and Enron took the trading model
and applied it to other fields where they might not have had the expertise
they had in natural gas, but in which their trading prowess would provide
benefits. They began to expand into electric power, water, fiber optic net-
works bandwidth capacity, pulp and paper, specialty chemicals, metals,
pollution credits and others, even eyeing the worldwide market in pollu-
tion credits that would result from implementation of the Kyoto Accords.
At its peak, Enron traded in over 1800 markets. 26
B. The Second Story-Lumpy Markets
Enron's design was to become the ultimate trading company, nearly a
virtual firm. As such, it hired bright, high-energy young people. The only
necessary hard assets were tables, chairs and computers. The trading busi-
ness relied on brain power and bravado, and, seemingly, was not capital
intensive. Enron moved trading activities to the Internet with Enron
Online.
What Enron discovered, though, was that while it had purchasers, it
did not have sellers. At other times, the reverse was true. The markets in
many other areas were not as well developed as in natural gas. Imbalances
between the buy and sell sides, if not an absence of traders, plagued what
often turned out to be thin markets. To remedy this, sometimes to tide
itself over until a time when markets became more liquid and also to earn
26. See PETER C. FUSARO & Ross M. MILLER, WHAT WENT WRONG AT ENRON:
EVERYONE'S GUIDE TO THE LARGEST BANKRUPTCY IN U.S. HIsTORY, 77-78 (2002).
[Vol. 48: p. 989
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markups rather than mere broker's commissions, Enron began to enter
into trading transactions as the counterparty.
As a counterparty, Enron often had to obtain or maintain an inven-
tory of product, or contractual rights to receive product. Suddenly, a busi-
ness that had very light capital requirements became an extremely capital
intensive one. To continue to push the envelope as a trading company,
Enron needed cash and liquid assets. Fortunately, Enron had hard assets
galore, ranging from its pipelines and gas companies to its water company
(Azurix), to Portland General Electric, the electric utility in Oregon.
C. The Third Story-The Asset-"Lite" Business Plan
Enron began to relieve itself of hard assets.2 7 The corporation sold
assets, and bits and pieces of assets sometimes at a loss, sometimes booking
a profit on the sales. Enron also "sold" choses in action, such as shares of
stock in subsidiaries it intended to spin off and take public, or even more
contingent claims, such as options to acquire shares in those future ven-
tures. The asset-"lite" strategy had at least three goals: (1) create liquidity
so that Enron could act quickly to begin trading in new markets and be
the counterparty; (2) free up cash to acquire other hard assets when that
was necessary to enter a new market such a fiber optics and broadband;
and (3) move debt off Enron's balance sheet to preserve the debt rating,
which, while never high, Enron enjoyed, and which gave Enron credibility
as a counterparty in trading transactions. "Without an investment-grade
bond rating, Enron could no longer be a viable counterparty for new busi-
nesses-it could no longer be relied upon to deliver on its side of the
contracts it wrote." 28
D. The Fourth and Final Act-Fastow Special Purpose Entities
and Shenanigans
At some point, Enron found that it could not sell or otherwise move
assets and related debt off its balance sheet quickly enough, or at all. It
was then that the newly promoted Andrew Fastow began breaking the
rules, in the process succumbing to the moral hazard and enriching him-
self by at least $45 million.
Very briefly, Enron had a venture, Joint Energy Development Invest-
ments (JEDI, orJEDI I) with the California Public Employees Retirement
System (CalPERS). Enron wanted to move CalPERS to a new venture,
JEDI II. Enron could not, however, find an investor who would substitute
for CaIPERS in JEDI I. So Enron manufactured a purchaser of CalPERS's
27. See, e.g., ENRON CORP., 2000 Annual Report, Management Discussion and
Analysis, available at http://www.enron.com/corp/investors/annuals/2000/about.
html ("We are participating in a New Economy and the rules have changed dra-
matically. What you own is not as important as what you know.... It is our intel-
lectual capital-not only our physical assets-that makes us Enron.").
28. FUSARO & MILLER, Supra note 26, at 117.
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interest, a special purpose entity, which, continuing the Star Wars theme,
Fastow and Enron named Chewco, after Chewbacca, the friendly hairy gi-
ant, who acted as Han Solo's co-pilot.
The rules for moving assets and related debts off books had become
well developed in the area of practice known as "securitization."2 9 For
example, a bank that wanted to free up capital that was "sunk" into mort-
gages or credit card receivables could create a new special purpose entity
(SPE), to which those assets would be sold. The SPE would offer securities
(often with high yields reflecting the risk of uncollectability of some of the
assets acquired) to the public through a private placement or other
offering.
Before investing, however, the public would want assurance that, if
the originator (the bank or other corporation) got into financial trouble,
the assets in the SPE would be "bankruptcy remote," that is, out of the
potential grasp of the originator's creditors. The assurance would be pro-
vided by the public's procurement (or really procurement by the invest-
ment banker doing the offering, long before the public was on the scene)
of a "true sale" opinion by a reputable law firm.
The prerequisites for a true sale opinion were simple. The SPE had
to have independent capital equivalent to three percent or more of the
total transaction. If the originator were moving $1 billion of rights to
movie box office receipts or student loan receivables, for example, it
would have to find independent investors willing to stake the new venture
with $30 million. Often, knowing that they would make far more on the
"spread" in the subsequent offering, investment banking firms would ad-
vance the three percent.
The SPE also had to have an independent governance structure. So
whether the SPE were a business trust, a limited liability company, a corpo-
ration or some other vehicle, the originator could not control the trustees,
managing members, directors or other similar actors.
Fastow had difficulty finding a three percent "grubstake" or "seed cap-
ital" investor for Chewco. Finally, he was able to get Barclay's Bank to
advance funds under an arrangement termed a "participation," which
looked like equity of some kind, but was really a loan. After that, Fastow
vowed, "never again." He then formed two partnerships named after his
wife, Lea, and his two children, which he termed LJM1 and LJM2. These
partnerships entered the private placement market, raising hundreds of
29. See, e.g., Michael J. Cohn, Asset Securitization: How Remote Is Bankruptcy Re-
mote?, 26 HoFsrRA L. REv. 929, 929-80 (1998); Christopher W. Frost, Asset Securitiza-
tion and Corporate Risk Allocation, 72 TUL. L. REV. 101, 101-02 (1997); Walter G.
McNeill & DanielJ. Mette, Accounting for Securitizations Under FAS 125: Why Lawyers
Are Writing About It, 114 BANKING L.J. 716, 717-19 (1997). A "securitization"
keyword search produced 172 citations to articles with securitization in the title.
The Legal Trac Search dated January 3, 2003, is on file with the author. A post-
Enron literature is also developing. See generally, Kenneth N. Klee & Brendt C.
Butler, Asset-Backed Securitization, Special Purpose Vehicles and Other Securitization Is-
sues, 35 UCC L.J. 23 (No. 2) (2002).
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millions of dollars on the promise of fantastic returns which, ultimately,
they delivered.
In turn, the LJM partnerships became the supplier of "seed capital" to
an array of SPEs Fastow created, which could take your breath away, nine
hundred or so by one count. Fastow flouted all of the rules. In many of
the SPEs, he, or one of his lieutenants, such as Michael Kopper, served as
trustee or managing partner, raking in handsome management fees in the
process. There was neither independent investment nor independent
governance.
Fastow moved everything but the kitchen sink, including junk, into
SPEs. One transfer that illustrates the phantasmagoric reality of what oc-
curred on Fastow's watch at Enron involved NewPower Holdings.3 0 Enron
had a subsidiary that Enron Energy Services (EES) spun off, NewPower
Holdings. In its very best year, NewPower booked a $25 million loss on
$7.8 million in revenues. 3 1 In the spin off, EES contributed electric and
natural gas contracts to NewPower. In return, it received 14.8 million
shares and options to acquire 45 million NewPower shares at $.05 per
share. Enron dropped these options, which were restricted and not imme-
diately exercisable, down into a series of limited liability companies it
formed, McGarret 1, 11, III and so on. The entertainment theme here was
the television series, "Hawaii 5-0," and in fact one of the entities Fastow
used was "Hawaii 125-0."
The McGarret entities then sold tranches of the options to a series of
Delaware business trusts, Hawaii I, II, III and so on. The Hawaii trusts
were able to obtain cash from banks-in this case the International Bank
of Commerce in Canada-because Enron would pledge Enron shares to
secure the loan, give guarantees to the lender or do whatever it took. In
the process, the "independence" of the SPE became an even larger joke.
Enron, though, would do further violence to the independence of the
SPEs. To work both sides of the street (or have its cake and eat it too-
choose your metaphor) Enron would enter into "total return swaps" with
the trusts so that Enron could enjoy any increase in value of the NewPower
options. When NewPower successfully sold shares at $21 per share, first in
a private placement, and later in an initial public offering, Enron "marked
to market" the swaps, which, in turn, were proxies for the options, which
were proxies for shares themselves. In that way, Enron booked $52 mil-
lion in the McGarret A swap and $66 million in the McGarret B swap.
After the NewPower IPO on October 5, 2000, Enron booked an additional
$184 million in "vapor" revenue.3 2
The NewPower offering went off at $21 per share. If the share price
fell, as prices often do after a public offering, Enron would again have to
30. See generally In re Enron, No. 01-16034(AJG), at 22-34 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21,
2002) (First Interim Report of Neal Batson, Court-Appointed Examiner).
31. See id. at 25.
32. See id. at 30.
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mark to market, recognizing losses on its total return swap. To lock in its
gains of $246 million in excess of related debt, Enron entered into hedge
transactions regarding the NewPower "Hawaii" transactions. The hedge,
however, was with another Enron off-books entity, Porcupine I, LLC. En-
ron traded the total return swaps in exchange for Porcupine's $259 prom-
issory note, entitling Porcupine to any further increase (not likely) in the
NewPower shares.
The hedge, of course, was a sham. There was no shifting of the risk.
Instead, Enron removed the risk of a decline in the NewPower shares from
one pocket and placed it in another. By December 31, 2000, the
NewPower shares had declined to $9.81. Enron had to write down the
value of the total return swaps by $200. The hedge was as useless as Porcu-
pine was insolvent. Nevertheless, Enron postponed the day of reckoning
by "cross collaterization agreements" by and between Enron and the LJM2
partnership involving the assets of four Raptor SPEs.33
Just this bit of legerdemain with NewPower options allowed Enron to
book $370 million in income in 2000, which was fifteen percent of Enron's
total income before interest and taxes (IBIT). So even in 2000, the last
"good" year for Enron, the emperor had no clothes.
E. Creative Destruction?
The first three Enron stories recounted here involve no wrongdoing.
They demonstrate some of the difficulties inherent in the creation of a
near virtual trading firm. They demonstrate once again the pitfalls in
overly rapid expansion, an object lesson many entrepreneurial companies
never seem to learn. They may also demonstrate evolution of a "win at all
costs" culture that may be blameworthy in the moral but not in the legal
sense.
34
Only in story number four does real wrongdoing raise its ugly head.
By and large, that wrongdoing seems confined to the CFO's office suite.
Subsequent events confirm this. The first and only higher-up at Enron
that the Justice Department is actively pursuing is Andrew Fastow, the En-
ron CFO who enriched himself with the SPEs he created.35 Looking back
on it, Jeffrey Skilling's explanation of what brought Enron down, a "run
33. See id. at 34.
34. See, e.g., FuSARO & MILLER, supra note 26, at 51-52 ("Enron has been de-
scribed by many employees as having an absolutely cutthroat culture that pitted
one employee against another" and "an environment where most employees were
afraid to express their opinions or to question unethical and potentially illegal
business practices.").
35. See Jonathan Weil, U.S. May Bring Criminal Charges Against Enron's Fastow
Next Week, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2002, at A3. But see Rebecca Smith & John Em-
shwiller, Prosecutors Probe Skilling's Role in Enron's Failed Telcom Venture, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 13, 2002, at Al (reporting that Enron booked $110 million profit in failed
Braveheart video on demand venture with Blockbuster Video).
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on the bank," has more plausibility.3 6 As the value of Enron shares fell,
the value of much of the assets pledged to secure many of the SPEs' obli-
gations to third party lenders (Enron shares and other obligations) fell,
leading to defaults, triggering yet further defaults.
Assessing Horatio Nelson "blind eye" fault at Enron is altogether an-
other matter.37 Skilling seems disingenuous when in testimony he denies
knowledge of the company's vast network of complex partnership to hide
debt.38 His answer to nearly every question posed (badly) by Senators on
the Commerce Committee was the same: "I am not an accountant."
By acceptance of outrageously high directors' fees and, in many cases,
consulting contracts as well, the Enron board members compromised
their independence. Whether they turned a blind eye to observable
wrongdoing seems doubtful. They seemed to not ask the right questions,
to have been too eager to waive the Enron code of conduct's conflict of
interest provisions, so that Fastow could be managing partner of SPEs he
created and to have failed in coordinating the work of their committees.
Board members face several lifetimes' worth of civil litigation, but, evi-
dently, the Justice Department has decided not to pursue any board mem-
bers criminally.
All in all, beyond Andrew Fastow and his gunslinger mentality, it is
difficult to assess blame. It is even more difficult to write prescriptions for
discrete reforms that will raise the level of performance of all the myriad
gatekeepers and monitors who play important roles in United States cor-
porate governance.
IV. ENRON AND SARBANES-OXLEY-ROADMAP TO MEANINGFUL REFORM?
This Part discusses what Congress did, without too much in the way of
excursions into technical detail. I confine myself to corporate governance
subjects, leaving for another day those Sarbanes-Oxley Act provisions that
belong in the area of securities law.
A. CEO and CFO Quarterly and Annual Section 302 Certifications of
Financial Statements and Internal Accounting Controls
Under section 302 of the Act, the CEO and the CFO must certify that
they have reviewed the report (10Q or 10K), that the report does not con-
36. See Financial Collapse of Enron-Part 2: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Over-
sight and Investigators of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 91-93
(2002) (quoting testimony ofJeffrey Skilling: "[I]t is my belief that Enron's failure
was due to a classic 'run on the bank'-a liquidity crisis spurred by a lack of confi-
dence in the company. At the time of Enron's collapse, the company was solvent,
and highly profitable, but, apparently not liquid enough.").
37. At the Battle of the Nile, the senior admiral ran up a signal "disengage"
on the flagship's yardarm. As a vice admiral in charge of a column of ships, Hora-
tio Nelson put his long glass to his blind eye, remarking "I see no signal." He then
engaged the French fleet, carried the day and added to his legend.
38. See FUSARO & MILLER, supra note 26, at 26.
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tain any material misstatement or omission and that "the financial state-
ments, and other financial information, fairly present in all material
respects the financial condition and results of operation of the issuer."
They must also certify that within the past ninety days, they have evaluated
the issuer's internal controls and that they have presented their conclu-
sions in the report. Finally they must certify ancillary facts supporting the
ultimate facts certified.
Four points may be made about these provisions and the SEC rules
that will implement them:
1. Overkill. These certifications and developing intracorporate
processes leading up to them will require an expenditure of significant
effort and be an event of great stress for many CEOs, CFOs and corporate
headquarters' staffs.3 9 The new regulatory scheme will pressure and stress
998 honest and capable CEOs and CFOs in order to reveal the one or two
rotten apples in the barrel (for example, the Rigas at Adelphia Communi-
cations, Inc.). The approach is a zero defects approach that is inefficient.
2. False Accuracy. This added certification of financial statements will
lead the public to believe, more than ever, that financial accounting pos-
sesses a degree of accuracy it can never possess. The "expectations gap"-
the gap between what the public expects and what accountants can de-
liver-will widen.40 Many questions regarding choice of accounting prin-
ciple, expensing versus capitalizing costs, revenue recognition and so on
have subjective elements to them. The exact same facts may lead to differ-
39. SEC Adopts CEO, CFO Certification Rules for Periodic Reports, Fulfilling New
Law, 34 SEC. REc. & L. REP.(BNA) 1452 (Sept. 2, 2002). In reality, the CEO and
CFO must make no less than nine individual determinations, certifying, as follows:
1. They have read the quarterly or annual report.
2. Based on their knowledge, the report does not contain any untrue
statements of a material fact or fail to state a material fact.
3. The financial statements and the financial information contained
therein fairly present in all material respects the financial condition and
the results of operations of the company.
4. They are responsible for establishing and maintaining "disclosure con-
trols and procedures."
5. They have designed the disclosure controls and procedures to ensure
that material information is made known to them.
6. Within the previous ninety days, they have evaluated the effectiveness
of the company's disclosure controls and procedures.
7. They have presented in the report their conclusions regarding controls
and procedures.
8. They have disclosed to the outside auditors and to the audit committee
all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal account-
ing controls and procedures.
9. They have indicated in the report whether or not there were any signif-
icant changes in internal accounting controls that could affect controls
subsequent to their evaluation.
40. See Donald C. Langevoort, Managing the Expectations Gap in Investor Protec-
tion: The SEC and the Post-Enron Reform Agenda, 48 VILL. L. REv. (forthcoming July
2003). Professor Langevoort expounds on this theme in his contribution to this
symposium. See id.
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ing results depending upon who the accountants, CEOs, CFOs and other
decision makers are.
3. Filling the Gaps in GAAP? In the United States, accountants audit
financial statements prepared by the company. The accountants then
render an opinion that "the financial statements .. present fairly, in all
material respects, the financial position of [the company] ... in conform-
ity with accounting principles generally accepted in the United States," or
GAAP. 4 1 In much of the rest of the English-speaking world, accountants
step up to the plate, rendering an opinion that the financial statements
"present a true and fair view" of the state of affairs within the company.4 2
Consistency with GAAP is secondary.
From time to time courts in the United States have gone further. If
GAAP does not result in an accurate picture, then the accountant must go
beyond GAAP to ensure that a fair and accurate picture was presented.
From time to time the SEC has joined in this view.4 3
Sarbanes-Oxley may then bring the United States closer to a world-
wide standard and make clear that the primary onus for a "true and fair
view" rests with the corporation's senior executive officers.
4. Conscience Raising. The legislation will certainly bring to the fore-
front of CEO and CFO consciousness the importance of financial report-
ing and internal controls that aid in the production of reliable
information.
B. Annual Section 404 Certification
In SEC Form 10K, the CEO and CFO must also make a different sort
of certification. They must (1) state the responsibility of management for
establishing and maintaining internal accounting controls; (2) assess the
effectiveness of those controls; and (3) obtain and include an attestation
by the outside auditors as to management's assessments. 44 Although there
seems to be some overlap with the section 302 certifications, and the legis-
lation seems to have been put together in slap dash fashion, advisers are
treating the two sets of certifications altogether separately and an argot
has developed. In Sarbanes-Oxley speak, lawyers and accountants talk of
302 and 404 certifications.
41. Letter of Arthur Andersen, LLP, in ALAsKA AIR GROUP, 2001 ANNUAL RE-
PORT 51.
42. See, e.g., Corporations Act, 2001 (No. 50) §§ 295-299 (Austl.).
43. See United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796, 805-06 (2d Cir. 1969) (indicating
that "compliance with generally accepted standards was 'evidence which may be
persuasive but not necessarily conclusive that he acted in good faith and that the
facts as certified were not materially false or misleading"').
44. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 404, 116 Stat. 745,
789 (2002).
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C. Audit Committee Requirements
Audit committees, which all of the self-regulatory organizations
(SROs) already require, now must be comprised exclusively of indepen-
dent directors. 45 Implementation is to be by SEC supervised amendment
of the SRO's listing standards. At least one director on the committee
must be a "financial expert."4 6 As a matter of federal law, the audit com-
mittee now will be "directly responsible for the appointment, compensa-
tion and oversight of the work" of the outside auditor, and the auditing
firm will report to the audit committee rather than the full board.4 7 The
Act grants the audit committee authority as a matter of federal law to en-
gage independent accountants and other consultants. 4 8 Each year the au-
ditors must make a formal report to the committee regarding critical
policies and practices being used and communications between manage-
ment and the auditors. 4 9 In short, not management, and not the board of
directors, but the audit committee has become the client of the outside
auditing firm.
Federal law now also mandates that it is the audit committee which is
to be the receptacle for anonymous submissions by corporate employees
concerning "questionable accounting and auditing matters." 50
The latter provision does what good practice shuns, that is, putting
upon audit committees responsibilities that may cause the committee to
lose its focus. The provisions also do great violence to federalism. Boards
and board committees including their appointment and composition, are
matters of state corporate law.
Finally, another provision strengthens an audit committee's hand by
requiring that the committee approve in advance all auditing and non-
audit services provided to the corporation by the outside auditing firm.51
The downside is that, yet again, legal requirements and best practices com-
bine to make audit committee membership potentially a nearly full time
job.
45. See id. § 301 (to be codified as Securities Exchange Act § 10A(m)). Attor-
neys, bankers or consultants who receive fees directly or through their firms may
continue to serve on the board but may not serve on the audit committee. See id.
46. See id. §§ 401 (a)-(b). The SEC has power by regulation to define "expert."
See id.
47. See id. § 301 (to be codified as Securities Exchange Act § 10A(m) (2)).
48. See id.; cf PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS § 3.04 (1994) (outlining "Right of Directors Who Have No Significant
Relationship with the Corporation's Senior Executives to Retain Outside Ex-
perts"). The section recommends empowering the independent directors "acting
as a body by the vote of a majority of such directors [rather than the audit commit-
tee], to retain legal counsel, accountants, or other experts, at the corporation's
expense." Id.
49. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 204.
50. See id.
51. See id. § 202 (to be codified as Securities Exchange Act § 10A(i)).
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D. Expanded Penny Stock Reform Act Powers to Bar Service as Officer
or Director
The SEC chafed under the 1990 requirement that the agency go to
federal district court. The Commission chafed further under the 1990 act
that required the agency prove "substantial unfitness to serve." Last of all,
the SEC felt burdened by the court's adoption of Professor Jayne Bar-
nard's six factor test of "substantial unfitness to serve."'52
Now the SEC can bar directors and officers in administrative proceed-
ings. The SEC staff need only prove "unfitness to serve."53
Essentially, this new power is federalization of the standards of con-
duct for directors. It constitutes the business equivalent of the "death pen-
alty."54 It is extremely scary "Big Brother" government in action.
E. CEO and CFO Forfeiture of Incentive Based or Equity Based Compensation
If the corporation restates financial results based upon prior "miscon-
duct," the CEO and CFO forfeit compensation received in the prior twelve
months, including profits from the sale of issuer stock during that pe-
riod.55 Precisely what the misconduct must be, and whether by the
higher-ups or merely by any subordinate, is unclear. What is clear is that
in some cases the penalty will operate in draconian fashion. It may lead to
further cover-ups rather than the prompt disclosure that is an overall ob-
jective of federal securities laws.
F. Prohibition on Loans or Arranging Credit for Corporate Officers
and Directors
Under Sarbanes-Oxley section 402(a), corporations may continue to
arrange home loans and certain types of consumer credit on "market
terms ... no more favorable than those offered by the issuer to the gen-
eral public."56 The provision aims to prevent the practice whereby corpo-
rations lent money or arranged for bank loans, so that corporate officials
could exercise stock options, paying off the loans with the proceeds of the
subsequent, and nearly simultaneous, sale of the shares.
52. SeeJackie Spinner, Errant Directors May Face SEC Ban; Agency to Request New
Authority, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 2002, at El; see alsoJayne W. Barnard, Wien Is a
Corporate Executive "Substantially Unfit to Serve"?, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1489, 1492-93
(1992) (enunciating her six factor test). The test was adopted, inter alia, by the
Second Circuit in SEC v. Patel, 61 F.3d 137, 141 (2d Cir. 1995) (delineating six
factors considered in resolving issue of substantial unfitness).
53. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 305 (amending Securities Exchange Act
§ 21 (d) (2)).
54. See Spinner, supra note 51, at El (quoting Orlan Johnson, Esq., of
Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy).
55. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 304(a) (to be codified as Securities Exchange
Act § 1OA(m) (2)).
56. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 402(a) (amending Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§ 13(k).
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State law used to regulate the practice. The 1950 Model Business Cor-
poration Act (MBCA) flatly prohibited loans to officers and directors. The
1969 MBCA permitted the practice, but only pursuant to a shareholder
vote. Finally, MBCA Third, promulgated in 1984, abdicated any special
control over loans to officers and directors.
57
Section 402(a) is a reaction to Enron's loans to Chairman Kenneth
Lay, which enabled him to exercise options and realize a $100 million
profit in the year of Enron's demise. Lay's revolving line of credit was
known as his "Enron ATM." He also repaid his loans through the sale of
shares back to the company, thereby avoiding monthly section 16(a)
reports.
G. Mandatory Codes of Ethics for Senior Financial Officers
Sarbanes-Oxley further provides that corporations must disclose
whether or not they have adopted a code of ethics for senior financial
officers (which all but masochistic managements will do).58 Changes in or
waivers of the code, as Enron's board twice did to facilitate Andrew Fas-
tow's service as managing partner of SPEs and receipt of gargantuan fees
therefore, are now reporting events for purposes of SEC Form 8K, which is
now to be filed on a real time, or near real time, basis. The code must
contain standards "reasonably necessary to promote honest and ethical
conduct, including the ethical handling of actual or apparent conflicts of
interest between personal and professional relationships" and promote
"compliance with applicable governmental rules and regulations."5 9
Corporate codes of conduct have been around for approximately
twenty years. Enron had a code. Codes can serve to raise the level of
ethical behavior within an organization, but only if they are taken seriously
and enforced. Here, though, Sarbanes-Oxley runs afoul of the age-old
proscription against attempts to legislate morality. The law cannot and
should not attempt to make itself coextensive with morality.
H. Corporate Officer and Direct or Real Time Section 16 Reporting
In this instance, "real time" means within two business days of a trade,
rather than the current requirement of reporting only within ten days af-
ter the last day of a month in which a trade takes place. 60 Further, compa-
nies must within three additional days post the trade information on the
company's web site.
In Enron Chairman Kenneth Lay's case, the SEC's rules required re-
porting only at the end of the calendar year, as Lay sold shares back to the
company rather than on the open market. The Act closes that loophole.
57. See generally BRANSON, supra note 3, § 8.21 (discussing MBCA Third's re-
quirements regarding "Loans to Officers and Directors").
58. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 406(a)-(b).
59. Id.
60. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 7 8p (1997).
1008 [Vol. 48: p. 989
20
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 4 [2003], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol48/iss4/1
2003] ENRON-WHEN ALL SYSTEMS FAIL 1009
Also, by the first anniversary of the Act's passage, section 16(a) reports
must be filed electronically. 6 1
Congress did not, however, correct what has become a real abuse:
under section 16, the date of acquisition of shares acquired pursuant to
stock options is the date the options were exercisable and not the date of
actual exercise. That construction permits corporate officers and direc-
tors to engage in virtually risk-free transactions, exercising options and im-
mediately selling shares without fear of section 16 liability.
Sarbanes-Oxley does introduce another form of section 16-like liabil-
ity. Either the corporation or any shareholder may sue to recover profits
made by any officer or director who trades company stock acquired by
virtue of his or her employment during any "blackout period" when corpo-
rate employees are not able to trade in their 401 (k) or similar individually
directed retirement plans.62 As Enron crumbled, of course, employees
had to endure an extended blackout period because of a change of plan
administrators. At the same time, Enron higher-ups continued to sell
shares.
I. Auditor "Revolving Door" Prohibition and Audit Partner
Rotation Requirement
The last four Sarbanes-Oxley provisions this Article addresses involve
monitors of companies rather than companies or directors and officers of
companies. An accounting firm may not provide audit services to any
company whose CEO, controller, CFO, chief accounting officer "or
[other] person serving in an equivalent position" in the past year worked
for the accounting firm.63 The Act thus may necessitate a one year wait
before an accountant who served as lead or audit partner or as reviewing
partner can pass through the revolving door leading into an audit client's
executive suites.
The Act requires accounting firms to rotate the lead audit partner at
least every five years. 64 The Act stopped short of requiring mandatory pe-
riodic rotation of audit firms that some onlookers recommended.
J. Auditor Registration and Separation of Consulting Services from Auditing
Firms that wish to audit publicly held corporations must register with
the new "Public Company Accounting Oversight Board" (the Board),
which the Act creates. 65 Registered firms must then submit annual and
61. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 403 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78p).
62. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 306(a) (1) (amending of Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974) § 101.
63. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 206 (to be codified as of Securities Exchange
Act) § 10A(1).
64. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 203 (to be codified as of Securities Exchange
Act) § 1OA(j).
65. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 102(a).
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other reports to the Board while at the same time paying annual fees,
which, along with payments by issuers, will fund the Board. Board staff
must undertake yearly inspections of any accounting firm that audits more
than one hundred reporting companies (specifically, the "Big 4"). At least
every three years, Board staff must inspect firms that audit less than one
hundred public companies (basically those firms known as the "medium
18").
More importantly, the Act takes what the SEC was nearly requiring by
regulation, enacting into positive law prohibitions on providing non-audit
services (consulting) while also providing audit services. 66 Enron paid $52
million to Arthur Andersen in 2000.67 Only $25 million was attributable
to audit services; the rest was for consulting and non-audit services. Thus,
the question raised is whether the desire to retain the non-audit revenues
compromised Arthur Andersen's administration of the annual audit or
caused it to turn a blind eye to obvious or easily discoverable wrongdoing.
The Act lists nine types of services that may no longer be performed
by accounting firms such as bookkeeping and other maintenance of ac-
counting records, financial information systems design, valuation services
and fairness opinions, actuarial services, management functions including
human resources, legal services and investment adviser services.68 Beyond
this catalogue, the Board may prohibit the provision of other non-audit
services. And, as has been seen, a company's audit committee must sign
off in advance on the outside auditor's provision of all audit and still per-
mitted non-audit services, such as tax services.69
K. Lawyers'Duty of Intracorporate Whistle Blowing
Perhaps lost in the mists of time are the SEC's efforts to obtain injunc-
tive relief against two prestigious law firms (White & Case of New York and
Lord, Bissell & Brook of Chicago) in SEC v. National Student Marketing
Corp.70 The SEC contended that, when faced with suspicious accounting
irregularities, lawyers should not have closed a merger transaction. In-
stead, they should have resigned and blown the whistle to the SEC. Judge
Parker refused to grant the injunction the Commission requested. Many
chalked National Student Marketing up to an overzealous manifestation of
"post Watergate" morality among SEC commissioners and staff.
Later, the SEC retreated from Judge Parker's position, but in a Rule
2(e) disciplinary proceeding the Commission did announce a rule for "in-
66. See, e.g., BRANSON, supra note 3, § 5.04 (discussing SEC's regulations con-
trolling conflicts of interest).
67. See id. (discussing SEC's regulations to prevent accounting conflicts of
interest).
68. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 201 (a) (to be codified as of Securities Exchange
Act) § 10A(g).
69. For a further discussion of audit committee requirements, see supra notes
44-51 and accompanying text.
70. 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978).
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ternal whistle blowing" for lawyers who practice securities law. In In re
Carter,71 the Commission held that, upon discovery of material disclosure
rule violations and the failure of a client to take corrective actions, "the
lawyer must take further, more affirmative steps," such as "[a] direct ap-
proach to the board of directors or one or more individual directors or
officers." 72
Sarbanes-Oxley mandates internal whistle blowing by attorneys who
practice before the SEC. The SEC is to prescribe "minimum standards of
professional conduct for attorneys."73 Those rules require attorneys "to
report evidence of a material violation of securities law or breach of fiduci-
ary duty or similar violation by the company or any agent thereof."74 The
attorney must first report the violation to the public company's chief legal
counsel or CEO. If those officials do not take appropriate action, the at-
torney then must report the evidence of wrongdoing to the audit commit-
tee, to the independent directors or to the full board of directors.
The penalty for a failure to blow the whistle may be censure, suspen-
sion or revocation of the privilege of practicing before the SEC. The pro-
vision, which is the brain-child of North Carolina Senator Edwards,
himself a successful attorney, also makes clear the SEC's authority to pro-
mulgate practice rules. The SEC is expressly given power to discipline a
person found not to possess "the requisite qualification to represent
others," to be "lacking in character or integrity, to have engaged in unethi-
cal or improper professional conduct" or to have willfully violated or aided
and abetted a violation of the securities laws.
L. Umbrella Whistle Blower Protection Provision
One set of monitors we often pass over are rank-and-file middle man-
agers and other employees. Two such managers at Enron blew the whistle,
but to no avail. Jeffrey McMahon, Enron's treasurer, met with Jeffrey Skill-
ing in March 2001 to raise his concerns about the SPEs and Andrew Fas-
tow's related conflicts of interest. Skilling refused to acknowledge that any
conflicts existed. He later testified, and maintained his facade of non-rec-
ognition, that the conflict of interest waivers Fastow later procured were
approved in a meeting in which the lights went out, but discussion contin-
ued in the dark-while Skilling had ducked out of the room. 75
The more famous Enron whistle blower was Sherron Watkins, a Vice-
President for Corporate Development. The day after Jeffrey Skilling sud-
denly resigned as CEO, August 15, 2002, she wrote a memorandum to
Kenneth Lay that began: "I am incredibly nervous that we will implode in
71. [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,847 (Feb. 28, 1981).
72. Id.
73. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 307.
74. Id.
75. See FUSARO & MILLER, supra note 26, at 140-41 (detailing Fastow's dealings
regarding relevant conflict of interest waivers).
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a wave of accounting scandals." Watkins singled out the Raptor SPE trans-
actions Fastow had engineered, but also voiced wider concerns. Lay met
with her three times and commissioned a law firm to investigate her allega-
tions. The law firm (Vinson & Elkins, Enron's regular outside counsel)
spent approximately forty hours on the matter, reporting back to Lay that
Watkins's fears were unfounded. 76 Shortly after this episode, Enron
shifted Watkins to Human Resources.
Presently, a criminal statute makes unlawful efforts by companies that
"discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass or in any other manner dis-
criminate" against an employee who provides information to, or otherwise
assists, a federal regulatory or law enforcement agency, a member of Con-
gress or "a person with supervisory authority" over the employee.7 7 If the
employee complains about conduct he or she "reasonably believes" to con-
stitute a violation of the securities laws or federal laws prohibiting fraud,
he or she is protected.78
Another provision creates an express civil cause of action for whistle
blowers who have been fired or demoted. These persons may seek rein-
statement, compensatory damages including back pay with interest, litiga-
tion costs and attorneys' fees.79
There are other provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley, such as a new, longer
limitations period for securities fraud actions, real time reporting on SEC
Form 8K and authority for the SEC to promulgate rules requiring inde-
pendence and objectivity by securities analysts. A problem with Sarbanes-
Oxley is that it goes off in so many different directions that it is difficult to
get one's arms around it or to explain all of what it does in any coherent
way. That said and done, it is time to make an overall assessment of the
legislation.
V. AN OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF SARBANES-OXLEY
A. Background
The Bush administration and Congress's approach is heavily regula-
tory, if not punitive: CEO/CFO certification of financial statements with
severe penalties for non-compliance,80 multiple reports on internal ac-
counting controls, real time disclosure to the SEC, two day electronic re-
porting of executives' stock transactions, beefed up audit committees,
codes of ethics for senior financial officers and much more.
76. See id. at 125-27 (discussing Enron's evaluation of accounting fears voiced
by Watkins).
77. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 806 (to be codified as 18 U.S.C. § 1514A).
78. See id.
79. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 806(b).
80. The penalties are up to ten years in prison and $1 million fine for "know-
ing" violations. The penalties escalate to up to twenty years and $5 million for
"willful" violations.
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Overall, though, we should remember that the current United States
governance regime has worked well, presiding over a decade of economic
growth unrivaled in our history. We should seek out what is good about
that regime in order to enhance it.
Regulatory approaches of the sort adopted have many faults. They
deter the informed risk taking we want corporate managers to take. They
add to the already considerable amount of regulation in existence. Regu-
lation begins to resemble sumptuary laws. Law is trivialized. More regula-
tion gives real wrongdoers and clever lawyers a stationary target. Most of
all, punitive and regulatory approaches often result only in "closing the
barn door after the horse is gone." In other words, they are the stick
rather than the carrot.
Traditionally, our approach to governance has relied on external
monitors who were proactive and objective, free of conflicts of interest.
These monitors, some of which rise to the level of gatekeepers in my
scheme, have substituted for owners (shareholders) who have become ge-
ographically dispersed and atomized in their holdings. Due to what may
be called collective action problems (identifying who fellow owners are,
communication costs, the SEC's proxy regulation scheme), owners found
it difficult to reassert themselves. Further, they could not efficiently moni-
tor management even if they wanted to, which most often they did not.
Proactive monitors of management substitute for dispersed owners
and nip dubious schemes in the bud. Capable monitors close the barn
door while the horse remains in the stall.
Two such groups of monitors have failed us badly in the recent era,
namely, high profile corporate lawyers and "Big Five" firm accountants.
Law firms used to have (and some still maintain) a senior lawyer or two
who were the "deal gurus," ethical watchdogs. Novel transactions and le-
gal "stretches" had to be run by the deal guru who might refuse his impri-
matur, stating reasons, orjust relying on a "smell test." "We won't sign off
on that" meant a trip back to the drawing boards. Apparently, no senior
partner at either Vinson & Elkins or Kirkland & Ellis filled that role as
progressively more bizarre transactions were structured for Enron.
In the area of accounting, in the 1970s, the SEC took steps to en-
hance auditor independence. A change of auditors was made a reportable
event for purposes of SEC Form 8K. Firms who had disagreements and
fired auditors had to report that situation publicly and almost instantane-
ously. The SEC brought several high profile court cases against corpora-
tions who manipulated or disregarded auditors' advice or commands.
Today, more often than not, profit means more than principle. Law
and accounting have become businesses rather than professions. From
the corporate standpoint, legal and accounting services have become com-
modities. If corporations can discover more compliant, or cheaper service
providers, corporations might migrate to them. Corporations spread their
2003] 1013
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legal business around so no one law firm, or law firm partner, has an over-
view of the corporation's activities.
Over the last twenty years, however, a third monitor has gained
strength, while the two groups of traditional monitors (accountants and
lawyers) have become weaker. The third monitor is the independent di-
rector or, more precisely, a board comprised of a super majority of truly
independent directors. Directors who have stature, integrity and true in-
dependence predominate on most corporate boards. Gone are outside
directors who have financial ties to the corporation or its managers. Con-
sequently, lawyers, investment bankers, commercial bankers and other
professional advisers seldom serve on boards anymore.
Proactive independent directors forcibly removed underperforming
or misguided CEOs at nine percent of the Fortune 500 in the first half of
the 1990s. At some corporations such as Apple Computer and General
Motors, directors did so more than once.
B. Fine Tuning the Corporate Board
We ought to take steps to enhance the independence of boards of
directors and otherwise polish the one bright light on the corporate gov-
ernance scene, as follows.
1. Real Time Reporting of Director Removal or Non Renomination
We should make the forced resignation, or failure to re-nominate an
incumbent independent director, a reporting event both for purposes of
SEC Form 8K and the annual proxy statement, as the SEC has done in
part. The corporation should have to disclose the reasons for the resigna-
tion or failure to re-nominate. The removed director (Walter Hewlett, for
instance) should be given an opportunity to respond.
2. Mandate the Nominating Committee
In its governance guidelines, the NASDAQ should require a nominat-
ing as well as an audit committee, as the NYSE recently has. NYSE and
NASDAQ guidelines should require that independent directors including
at least one female or director of color, should staff the committee.
Guidelines should prohibit membership by the CEO (when Archer Dan-
iels Midland (ADM) CEO H. Dwayne Andreas sat on the nominating com-
mittee, wags said that ADM also referred to the board, short for "All
Dwayne's Men"). We have seen too many instances (American Express,
Scott Paper, Sunbeam, Archer Daniels Midland, Morrison Knudsen, to
name a few) in which a CEO has been able to remold or reshape a board,
thus postponing a comeuppance for under performance or wrongdoing.
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3. Strengthen Director Education
Some countries, such as Malaysia, have instituted mandatory training
and certification programs for independent directors. That goes too far.
But independent director associations and institutes should be materially
strengthened and given prominence. The Institute of Company Directors
in Australia is worth emulating. A component of training might involve
increasing the accounting and financial literacy of additional (but not nec-
essarily all) directors so that literacy extends well beyond the audit com-
mittee membership. In other professions (law, medicine and accounting),
continuing education is of central importance. Why not for independent
directors of large corporations?
4. Separate the Offices of CEO and Chairperson
Most other countries with well developed "best governance practices"
require a separation between the offices of CEO and Chairperson. In fact,
the United States is a laughing stock in comparative corporate governance
circles. Many wonder, "How can the board of independent directors effec-
tively monitor a CEO who as Chairman controls the timing of, and the
agenda for, meetings?" The lead director concept espoused by the New
York Stock Exchange does not get the job done.8 ' It is time for the
United States to bite the bullet on this one. We should meet the prevail-
ing international standard.
5. Come Down Hard on Trophy Directors
Anne McLaughlin Korologos, a former Secretary of Labor, sits on
eleven boards. Rozanne Ridgeway, a former Assistant Secretary of State,
sits on eight. There should exist strong disincentives for board service on
more than two, or, at most, three boards of large, publicly held companies.
Directors who serve on six, eight or more boards simply are not capable of
the monitoring required. They are there for window dressing, or because
they are glad-handers or back-slappers.
C. Board Lessons from Enron
1. The Obvious Lessons
Enron is what I call a "roadmap" or "reverse roadmap" case.8 2 If, at
every crucial juncture, a board of directors takes the track opposite the
81. The lead director is a second-best compromise reached when a powerful
CEO refuses to vacate the office of board chair. See, e.g., Joann S. Lublin & Bruce
Orwall, To Buttress Governance, Disney Mulls Post of Presiding Director, WALL ST.J., Dec.
2, 2002, at A3 (discussing Disney CEO Michael Eisner's unwillingness to vacate
post of chairman).
82. See, e.g., Douglas M. Branson, Intracorporate Process and the Avoidance of Di-
rector Liability, 24 WAKE FoREsT L. REV. 97, 102 (1989) (explaining "roadmap" and
"reverse roadmap" cases, which provide process models for corporate manage-
ment in contexts such as maintaining duty of care).
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one the Enron board took, that later board will sail through, if not with
flying colors, then at least away from the shoal water. So considered, En-
ron's teachings are obvious.
For example, Enron directors were often told that Enron was engaged
in "high risk" accounting practices-practices that "push the limits."8 3
The obvious teaching for later boards: scrutinize closely novel accounting
practices and tread warily with any such practices that "push the limits."
Enron had an audit committee of six members, chaired by the ex-
dean of Stanford's Graduate School of Business, Dr. Robert K. Jaedicke,
whose specialty is accounting. The audit committee should have been the
first line of defense against the accounting irregularities and off-books she-
nanigans that occurred. The committee failed, quite badly. Thus, once
again, post-Enron the teachings are obvious: strengthen requirements for
audit committees by requiring the audit committee chair to possess finan-
cial management or accounting expertise, and by requiring a written audit
committee charter that obligates the committee to oversee the company's
financial statements and accounting practices and to hire and fire the
outside auditor. 84
In 1999 and again in 2000, Andrew Fastow requested that the board
grant waivers of conflict of interest prohibition in the Enron Code of Con-
duct. Fastow made the request to be able to act as the managing partner
of the LJM1 and LJM2 partnerships. Fastow then proceeded to take ad-
vantage of Enron in many Enron-LJM transactions, reaping $45 million in
compensation for himself. The teaching: have a company-wide code of
conduct, police its enforcement and grant waivers sparingly, if at all.
All of the corporate governance gurus, self proclaimed or otherwise,
have been reiterating and elaborating on these obvious teachings of En-
ron. The repetition and re-examination are certainly beneficial. But the
question the remainder of this Article asks is what are the less obvious
teachings? Are there bits of advice to be gleaned from Enron that have
not been splashed in the pages of the law reviews, business journals, Wall
Street Journal or New York Times?
2. Enron's Subtle Teachings
a. The Independent Directors, Either as a Committee of the Whole, or
While Serving on Audit, Finance, Nomination or Other
Committees, Must Exclude Senior Managers from Part or
All of Their Sessions
Enron's board of sixteen members was a hard-working board. Cus-
tomarily, they had five regular meetings per year, each of which began
with a dinner followed by two full days of meetings thereafter.8 5 In addi-
83. See TirE ROLE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECrORS IN ENRON'S COLLAPSE, S. REP.
No. 107-70, at 12, 14 (2002).
84. See id. at 4 (setting forth final committee recommendations).
85. See id. at 9 (detailing Enron board's traditional schedule).
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tion, the board had one or two meetings a year away from Houston, often
at a foreign locale in which Enron had a facility.
8 6
On the first day of meetings, most of the Enron board's five commit-
tees (executive, finance, audit and compliance, compensation and nomi-
nating) would meet.8 7 No committee met without the presence of former
CEO Kenneth Lay, CEO Jeffrey Skilling or both, as well as other senior
managers.88 The independent directors never met in executive session,
and there was not a designated "lead" or "presiding" director to convene
such meetings.8 9
Independent directors have to assure themselves of opportunities for
acting independently. Otherwise, their presence on the board may be-
come an empty gesture. A good practice might be for the independent
directors to meet at least once per year. A further practice might be to
exclude senior managers from part or all of committee meetings.
b. Ensure Auditor "Face Time" with the Audit Committee
Arthur Andersen regularly sent three partners to Enron board meet-
ings. Those partners, however, never met with the audit committee with-
out the senior managers being present. Skilling, Lay and others always
were in the room with the auditors and audit committee.0 How can the
audit committee and auditors make a frank assessment of the abilities and
performance of senior accounting and financial personnel, a central audit
committee function, if the captains of the management team are hovering
over the deliberations? Like the previously discussed teaching, this is a
simple point, but it may point to the precise juncture at which Enron be-
gan to spin out of control.
c. The Board Should Conduct, or Oversee the Conduct of, "360
Degree" Reviews of Senior Executive Officers
One view of Enron may be that nothing untoward occurred until the
fourth story recounted above, when the finance unit began to make a
mockery of the use of off-books special purpose entities. The corollary is
that, as with Scott Sullivan at WorldCom or the Rigas family at Adelphia
Communications, the cause of the eventual failure of the firm was the
wrongdoing of one or two individuals, rather than some sort of systemic
governance failure.
86. See, e.g., id. at 15-16 (discussing Enron operations, audit committee meet-
ings and board meetings in England and India).
87. See id. at 9 (describing Enron board committees).
88. See id. at 10 (noting attendance at various committee meetings).
89. See id. (identifying structure of Enron board committee meetings).
90. See id. at 10, 57 (noting presence of Lay, Skilling and others at all Audit
Committee meetings and that "[t]he audit committee had very limited contact
with Andersen, essentially communicating with Andersen personnel only at Board
meetings").
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In the human resources world, the "360 degree" annual review is be-
coming common. Superiors, peers and subordinates, as well as others
(customers, outside auditors, lawyers) review a manager's performance.
Some corporate boards now undertake "360 degree" reviews of the CEO
and of the board chair. Still other boards cause "360 degree" reviews to be
conducted of all senior managers.
Had the Enron board done so, an argument may be made that Fastow
and the finance unit he headed could never have wandered as far afield as
they did. If not as a matter of course, the conduct of a performance review
could have been triggered by Fastow's first request for a code of conduct
waiver, in early to mid-1999. 9 As it was, there were no meaningful reviews
of Fastow or of his department. Even CEOJeffrey Skilling testified that he
"did not, as a matter of course, review [the LJM] transactions for fairness
or sign the relevant documents." 92 The first serious questioning did not
occur until October 2001, a month before Enron entered bankruptcy.
At that time, board and compensation committee member Dr.
Charles LeMaistre was detailed by his committee to question Fastow. 93 Dr.
LeMaistre's handwritten notes "indicate[d] that Mr. Fastow admitted re-
ceiving LJM compensation totaling $45 million, $23 million from LJM1
and $22 million from LJM2.119 4 In a handwritten note in the margin, Dr.
LeMaistre referred to this finding as "incredible." 95
d. Provide for Effective Networking and Coordination Among Board
Committees and Between a Committee and the Full Board
Much of the modern board's work is done through committees, and
post Sarbanes-Oxley, perhaps too much so. Whether the latter is true is a
question that might be examined in the future.
What is clear from the Enron debacle is that the committees failed
adequately to communicate with one another. Thus, for example, in Oc-
tober 1999, the finance committee conducted a "vigorous discussion" re-
garding the LJM partnerships and the potential for abuse.96 They
intended to put in place a set of controls to ensure that Enron received
fair deals from the LJM transactions with various special purpose
entities.9 7
91. See id. at 24.
92. Id. at 29.
93. See id. at 33.
94. Id. at 34.
95. See id. (describing LeMaistre's handwritten notes from his conversation
with Fastow).
96. See id. at 25-26 (detailing board meeting to ratify second code of conduct
waiver that would allow Fastow "to set up and manage LJM2, hold an ownership
interest in the fund, locate additional investors and financing, and receive com-
pensation for his efforts").
97. See id. (discussing purpose of board meeting).
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The finance committee, however, depended on the audit committee
to supplement and implement the controls, but, evidently, did not coordi-
nate that process with the audit committee.98 Meaningful review of the
LJM partnership transactions thus fell between the cracks that existed be-
tween the two board committees. The handoff to the audit committee was
incomplete. The effort was piecemeal and haphazard.
The answer may be a "committee on committees" structure. The full
board may serve that function, but in this author's experience at least, the
portion of a board meeting devoted to committee reports generally is the
portion that garners the least attention from fellow directors. They are
opening mail, scanning their board packet or are otherwise distracted, ea-
ger to get through committee reports and on to the main agenda. They
do not ask probing questions, let alone inquire into how well committees
are networking with one another. Perhaps, as an adjunct to meetings of
the full board, and as a "committee on committees," the committee chairs
should hold a short meeting to discuss overlaps and joint efforts by
committees.
e. Limit Cash and Stock Compensation for Directors to Near the Mean
for Similar Public Companies and Prohibit Consultantships for
Directors
Enron paid Lord John Wakeham, a chartered accountant, $72,000
per year for consulting services in accounting.9 9 Board memberJohn Ur-
quhart and his Connecticut based consulting firm received $493,914 in
2000.100 Board member Charls Walker, a tax lobbyist, received $70,000,
paid to firms he controlled. 10 1 A company on whose board director Her-
bert Winokur also served, the National Tank Company, sold $1,035,000,
$643,793, $535,682 and $370,294 of equipment to Enron in the years
1997-2000.102
Enron donated $50,000 to George Mason University and its Mercatus
Center headed by board member Dr. Wendy Gramm.10 3 Over five years,
Enron, and Chairman Ken Lay, contributed over $600,000 to the Ander-
sen Cancer Center, over which two Enron board members, Dr. Charles
LeMaistre and Dr. John Mendelson, had at various time presided as
president.l 4
98. See id. at 30 ("The Audit Committee was charged by the Board with per-
forming an annual review of the LJM transactions.").
99. See id. at 51 (discussing Enron's payments to board member John
Wakeham).
100. See id. (discussing Enron's payments to board memberJohn Urquhart).
101. See id. at 52 (discussing Enron's payments to board member Charls
Walker).
102. See id. at 51-52.
103. See id. at 52 (discussing Enron's ties to outside board members).
104. See id.
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In the Senate hearings, Professor Charles Elson of the University of
Delaware testified unequivocally that directors should have "no financial
connection to the company whatsoever," other than their board compen-
sation.105 Elaborating, he stated that "[i]f a director's role is as a consult-
ant, hire the director as a consultant. If the director's role is to be a
director, hire him as a director. You cannot blend the two."1 0 6 Retired
Sunoco board chair and CEO, Robert Campbell, agreed with Professor
Elson: "consulting arrangements with directors are absolutely incorrect,
absolutely wrong."1 117
The courts have not agreed. For example, in Katz v. Chevron Corp.,")8
the Court found that, as a matter of law, receipt by a director's investment
banking firm of a $229,000 fee did compromise the director's status as an
independent director.1 0 9 Nonetheless, best practices support Professor El-
son's and Mr. Campbell's views, rather than the findings ofjudges in legal
matters.
In addition to Enron's consultantships, charitable donations and busi-
ness dealings with firms they controlled, Enron directors also benefited
from generous direct compensation: "Enron board members were com-
pensated with cash, restricted stock, phantom stock units and stock op-
tions. The total cash and equity compensation of Enron board members
in 2000 was valued by Enron at about $350,000 or more than twice the
national average for board compensation at U.S. publicly traded corpora-
tions." I'"I But members of the Enron board were persons of high reputa-
tion and integrity. They would neither compromise their integrity nor
jeopardize their reputations for the sake of high board compensation.
Similarly, it can be said of all, or most, Enron directors, neither consulting
arrangements nor charitable gifts to favored charities nor any other finan-
cial inducement would cause them to do what they believed to be morally
wrong or even bad business practice.
Instead, the corrupting influence of inordinate board compensation
is more subtle. High compensation leads more to group think than indi-
vidual corrupt acts. It leads to a culture of "winning," a culture of success
that may or may not be justified by the underlying economic reality of
what is occurring within the company. It leads to a culture that has high
on its agenda preservation of the good times, for board members as well as
executives of the company.
105. See id. at 53.
106. Id. at 52-53.
107. Id.
108. 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 681 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
109. See id. at 689-90 (analyzing whether Samuel Armacost, outside director of
company at issue, was "in a position to base his decision on the merits of the issue
rather than being governed by extraneous considerations or influences"). See gen-
erally BRANSON, supra note 3, §§ 7.08-7.10.
110. S. REip. No. 107-70, at 11. Average total board compensation at the top
two hundred U.S. public corporations in 2000 was $138,747. See id. at 11 n.9 (pro-
viding background statistics).
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In the first years of Enron's innovation and climb to the top, the cul-
ture was justified by the underlying reality. In the last few years, the oppo-
site occurred. High board compensation and the winner's culture thereby
engendered prevented the board from seeing early signs that the underly-
ing reality was crumbling. The board of directors, its committees and per-
haps even some of the senior executives went blithely on, lulled into a
false sense of security by their high compensation, consulting and similar
arrangements and rising share price.
VI. CONCLUSION: CREATIvE DESTRUCTION OF A DIFFERENT KIND
When I visit law school classmates, I find that after twenty-five years of
law practice, many have become wealthy. They have not achieved wealth
directly, through the practice of law. They have achieved wealth indi-
rectly-by investing in clients' businesses or by going into partnerships
with clients. I remonstrate with them. "What about the conflicts of inter-
est?" "What about the loss of objectivity?" "What about the possibility of
being sued?"
They reply, "We've got the 'good deal exemption' on this one."
Others of them remind me that "a rising tide floats all boats." If a client's
business is a "sure thing," the increasing value of everyone's investment
covers over any conflicts of interest or loss of objectivity. Rising tides not
only float all boats, they cover up mistakes, intuition gone awry and even
some forms of intentional wrongdoing.
Enron embodied that "ever rising tide" culture, what Professor Wil-
liam Bratton refers to as the "culture of winning." 1 1' So too did
WorldCom, Global Crossing, Tyco and ImClone. Enron's most important
contribution to our political economy may then be neither Sarbanes-
Oxley, which may not achieve significant "real" reform, nor any other dis-
crete reform that this or any other article may discuss. Enron's contribu-
tion instead has been to dampen down or kill off that culture and the
moral hazards it presents. Enron's most important teaching is its least ob-
vious one.
111. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Vahte,
76 TUL. L. REv. 1275, 1360 (2002) ("It all came to a head with Enron, where pres-
sure to maximize and a culture of winning combined to draw a huge firm into risk-
prone decision making.").
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